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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
attract patrons who would not otherwise have come. They concluded on
this basis that a ticket of admission was in fact part payment for a chance
and hence consideration was present.
This view of consideration has been criticized 24 on the ground that it
does not follow that a consideration sufficient to support a contract is neces-
sarily the kind of consideration contemplated by the statutes prohibiting
lotteries. In popular conception a lottery presupposes a pecuniary or valu-
able consideration for the chance to participate in the contest.2 5 Did the
framers of the Missouri Constitution have anything more technical in mind
when they passed the lottery provision? Apparently they did for "gift en-
terprises"128 are included in the prohibition and such schemes do not need
consideration to make them illegal.
E. C.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-FRAUDULENT JOINDER- PLEADING- [Federal]. -
The plaintiff brought a tort action in a state court to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained as the result of the sale to him of a defectively
constructed automobile. Suit was brought against the resident dealer and
non-resident manufacturer jointly. The latter sought to remove the case
to the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship and separable
controversy. Held; where a plaintiff states a case of joint tort liability
there is no separable controversy, even though plaintiff might have sued
resident and non-resident defendants separately, unless claim of joint lia-
bility is obviously frivolous and unsound or facts so clearly false as to dis-
close a fraudulent device to prevent removal to federal court.'
While a few federal cases have held otherwise, 2 it seems to be well set-
tled that a separable controversy does not exist where the plaintiff states a
case of joint tort liability.3 In such cases, the federal court, on petition to
remove, will not try the essential merits of the case to determine whether
the joinder is proper. 4 The plaintiff has a right to elect his own method of
attack, and if his joinder is improper he will fail in the state court.5 But
the non-resident defendant can have the case removed on the ground of a
separable controversy by showing that the joinder was fraudulently made
24. Comment, 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 744 (1932); Comment, 18 Va. L. Rev.
465, (1932).
25. Webster's International Dictionary.
26. Missouri Constitution, Art. XIV, sec. 10 (1875), R. S. Mo. 1929, sec.
4314.
1. Siler v. Morgan Motor Co. et al., 15 F. Supp. 468 (D. C. E. D. Ky.,
1936).
2. Warax v. Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 637 (C. C., D. Ky., 1896).
3. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599, 10 S. Ct.
203, 33 L. ed. 473 (1889); Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U. S.
92, 18 S. Ct. 264, 42 L. ed. 673 (1897) ; Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v.
Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 26 S. Ct. 161, 50 L. ed. 441 (1905).
4. Doughtery v. Yazoo Ry. Co., 122 Fed. 205 (C. C. A. 5, 1903).
5. See Shane v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 150 Fed. 801, 808 (C. C., D. Mont.,
1906).
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for the purpose of preventing a removal to the federal court.0 His peti-
tion must allege that the joinder was fraudulent,7 and the allegations must
be proven.8 A fraudulent joinder exists where the petitioning defendant
has alleged and proven that plaintiff's allegations are unfounded and incap-
able of proof and were not made with the intent to prove them,0 or by show-
ing that plaintiff has no desire to prosecute the suit against the resident
defendant to a judgment.10 However, proof of the insolvency of the resi-
dent defendant will not make the joinder fraudulent."
If there is no question that under the state law the plaintiff has a jointi
cause of action, then his motive in joining the defendants is immaterial.12
Even if the joinder was improper under the state law, a removal will not
be granted if the joinder was made in good faith.' 3 Good faith means that
the plaintiff thought that under the facts of his case he had a joint cause
of action.14
The principal case follows the general rule and is illustrative of some
of the foregoing principles.
S. K.
REwARDs-SnERIFF'S RIGHT TO COLLEcT-CoNSIDERATION-[Kentucky].
It is undoubted law that an act of a public officer which is required by legal
duty cannot be sufficient consideration for a contractual promise to pay a
reward for the performance of the act.' But this principle is being re-
stricted by technical definitions of duty. The result is that an officer is per-
mitted to enforce a contract of reward, if he can show that he has done an
act outside the strict line of his duty. A recent Kentucky case, Kentucky
Bankers' Association et al. v. Cassady et al.,2 shows that this trend is recog-
nized in that state. The Pewee Valley State Bank was robbed, and the Ken-
tucky Bankers' Association, of which the Pewee Valley State Bank was a
6. Dobie, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1928) 408; Breymann et al.
v. Pa. etc. Ry. Co., 38 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 6, 1930).
7. Thomas v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 147 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 9, 1906).
8. Plymouth Gold Mining Co. v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118
U. S. 264 (1885).
9. Warax v. Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 637 (C. C., D. Ky., 1896).
10. Dishon v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., 133 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 6, 1904)
(resident defendant not served with summons).
11. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., 85 Fed. 876 (C. C., S. D.
Iowa, 1898).
12. Ibid; see Chicago Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S. 184, 194, 33 S. Ct.
250, 57 L. ed. 473 (1912).
13. See Alabama Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 218, 26
S. Ct. 161, 50 L. ed. 441 (1905).
14. Comment, 100 Cent. L. J. 99 (1927).
1. Restatement, Contr-acts (1932) sec. 76a; Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 66
Am. Dec. 658 (1856); Somerset Bank v. Edmund, 76 Ohio St. 396, 81 N. E.
641, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170 (1907); Mechem, Public Offices and Officers
(1890) sec. 885.
2. Kentucky Bankers Association v. Cassady, 94 S. W. (2) 622 (Ky.,
1936).
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